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Abstract
This paper describes the recent Swedish reform and available options on major issues within
this reform framework.  In June 1994, Sweden's Parliament passed legislation replacing the
old defined benefit system with a combination of a pay-as-you-go notional defined contribution
(NDC) and a DC privately managed financial account scheme, based on a total contribution
rate of 18.5 percent on earnings. The financial account scheme is run using a state-clearing
house as a broker,  and will have a state monopoly supplier of annuities. During the
accumulation period, participants can choose among all registered funds, about 500 when they
make their first choice in the autumn of 2000.  Accounts were created in 1999, and two annual
statements have been sent out since then.
If the NDC and financial account schemes together do not reach a minimum level by age 65,
and the individual chooses to retire at this age, benefits from these systems will be
supplemented up to the guarantee level, determined by Parliament and financed with a state
budget transfer. This reflects the fact that the PAYG NDC and financial account schemes are
designed to function autonomously from social policy. Life expectancy is factored into the
NDC annuity, and together with the financial account system, this innovation helps to shift the
risk of an aging society onto workers while they are still active. There is no maximum
retirement age, and the system offers a broad range of options for labor-force exit for older
workers. Full, partial or no earnings from work can be combined freely with full or partial
annuities from one or both of the public schemes from the minimum pension age of 61.The Swedish Pension Reform Model:  Framework and Issuesl
Part I  Introduction and Overview of the New System
1  Introduction
In legislation passed by Parliament during and after June,  1994, Sweden replaced its pay-as-
you-go, defined benefit system with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) notional defined contribution
(NDC) system and an advance funded second pillar with privately managed individual
accounts, supplemented with a guarantee at age 65 for persons with low lifetime earnings. The
earnings-related NDC PAYG commitment emulates the principles of a market-based defined-
contribution insurance scheme, although without advance funding - other than that which
follows with changes in cohort size - and with a rate of return based on the performance of the
economy rather than the financial market.
The old system being replaced combined a flat-rate universal benefit (Folkpension) with an
earnings-related supplement (ATP). A full earnings-related benefit could be obtained with 30
years of covered earnings at age 65, based on an average of the best 15 years.  This system
was unfair for persons with long working and large contribution histories and was expected to
require increases in contribution rates that were believed to be unacceptable to future workers.
In line with this, beginning in the 1980s, there emerged an increasingly widespread belief
among new entrants into the labor force and the general public that the system could not meet
its "promises"  in the future. Younger workers were becoming more and more skeptical about
their prospects as pensioners. In short, trust in the system was eroding, and it became clear to
experts and policy makers that something had to be done.
The old system was conceived in the 1950s in an economic environment with 4 per cent real
growth and much lower life expectancies. As the rate of per capita wage growth slowed down
to an average of around 2 percent and labor force growth stagnated, experts began to become
concerned that the contribution base would not grow rapidly enough in the future to support
the anticipated increase in old-age pensioners.  Actuarial calculations showed it would be
necessary to raise the contribution rate considerably  in order to meet future commitments,
although the extent of the problem,  as usual,  depended on the underlying assumptions. The
fact that it was not possible to say today what the likely outcome would be tomorrow was
itself seen to be a problem. There is general agreement that it is important to be clear about
the content of the intergenerational commitment of the pay-as-you-go system.
IThis  paper is an account of the discussions around the reform process in Sweden. which had many participants. including the politicians who
chiseled out the details so that in the  end they were to the satisfaction of around 80 percent of the Swedish Parliament. The issues discussed in this
paper were the topics of discussions through a two-year period in the Pension Working Group. In thinking further on the topics of retorm and in
writing this paper I have henefited  greatly from countless discussions with many colleagues. For specific comments on this paper. I would like to
thank Henry Aaron. Barry Bosworth and Robert D. Reischauer fir comnments  provided at a seminar at the Brookings Institute: and Karl Hinrichs.
Robert Hlolziiann  and Karl Gustaf Schermani.A deep economic recession and accompanying fall in the contribution base by around  10
percent in the early 1990s finally brought home the acute need for reform to a broad spectrum
of political interests. The recession came on the heels of the final report from the Pensions
Commission in 1990. In 1992, a newly elected government formed what was called the
Pension Working Group,  with a representative from each of the parties  in Parliament and a
few experts, and with a mandate to reform the then existing pension system. The principles  of
the reform were cast into the public arena for debate in the autumn of 1992. The first
legislation for the reform came in June 1994. Since this time, additional legislation has been
introduced, specifying more of the details of the reform, including some of the unresolved
political  issues  left in  1994.2
Social security reforms are inherently political and in the end inevitably represent
compromises among various interests. One of the strengths of the Swedish reform process is
that it emerged out of a political consensus among five of the seven parties in Parliament in
1994, representing over 80 percent of the voters, and this wide political support of the reform
has continued. Hopefully, the broad spectrum of political support, together with the content of
the reform itself, will be sufficient to guarantee that it will not only serve its purpose well but
will be supported by a strong political majority for a long time to come.
My aim in this monograph is broader than simply to document the Swedish reform. The
Swedish reform has brought together ideas that when woven together represent what many
consider to be a paradigm shift in old-age social security. For this reason,  my goal is to
present the general framework and main options available at each juncture,  and to comment on
theirstrengths  and weaknesses.
2  Overview of the Reform and Reform Goals
The overriding principle of the reform is that which has guided Swedish social policv since the
1950s. This is to provide an adequate earnings-related retirement  benefit with universal
coverage for all persons working and residing in Sweden, backed up by a safety net that
guarantees an adequate standard of living for the elderly. The Swedish reform has four main
goals. The first isfair  treatment of persons with different contribution histories.  Two persons
who have paid the same amount in contributions and who retire at the same time and at the
same age should be entitled to the same benefit. This entails relating the benefit solely to
lifetime money contributions,  and not to the number of years of contributions,  a specified
number of best years and/or seniority, all of which are frequently found components of
European social insurance systems. including the old Swedish system.
The second goal is transparent redistribution. This goal is achieved with redistributional
policy financed with general budget resources earmarked specifically for this purpose.  The
most important example is the minimum guarantee benefit designed to protect the lifetime
poor.
- One of thc must difficult technical  issues  ilaS  been  the specitication  of the transition  fromi  the old system  with an extra tax deduction  for
pensioners  to a svstem  where  all inc(ome  (earnings  and pension  benefits)  are  given eclual  tax  treatmenit.
2The third goal is financial  stability in the face of changes in demography and the economy. In
the "old" defined benefit system, it was assumed that future workers would pay the bill,
regardless of its size. In contrast,  in the NDC system individual decisions about work and
retirement are reflected in the size of the individual annuity, and the long-run aggregate
contribution rate future workers will pay to finance the system is the same as that paid
individually by workers today.
A fourth goal is to create financial saving managed by private financial institutions. During
the period in which the large birth cohorts of the 1940s will drain the reserves of the present
PAYG pension fund, the public financial saving will be maintained through the creation and
growth of new second pillar saving from younger workers.
A result of the reform is that older workers will be able to combine earnings from work and
retirement income in any way. with the same tax rules applying for both earnings and benefits.
In fact, a part of the reform was changing the tax rules for pensioners - from a system with an
extra deduction for pensioners - to create neutrality between sources of income. The NDC and
second pillar benefits can be claimed wholly or in part - together or separately - after
reaching the minimum retirement age of 61. This in turn means that work and benefits can be
combined in many different ways after this age.
The total contribution rate on earnings for the new old-age system will be 18.5 percent. Half
will be an employer contribution and half an employee contribution. For persons covered fully
by the new rules,  16 percentage points will go to the NDC PAYG component of the system
and 2.5 percentage points to a mandatory funded component. This specific split reflects the
goal to create the funded component, while honoring acquired rights under the old system and
staying within a given cost restriction (18.5 percent of earnings). A split within the framework
of the mandatory scheme between PAYG and funded components provides a portfolio that
combines economic and financial returns.
3  Implementation
Implementation of the reform began in 1995, when contributions for the second pillar were put
into an aggregate interest-bearing account at the National Debt Office. Additional
contributions have been set off every year since then. New information technology was
introduced in the Social Insurance Administration, and this made it possible to create account
data consistent with the ideas of the new reform.
Individual accounts were created for the NDC system using historical files from 1960.
Notional capital through 1994 is based on a contribution rate of 18.5 percent and from  1995-
1998 on 16.5 percent and from 1999 and thereafter on 16 percent,  with the difference from
18.5 percent going to the second pillar.  Once information from the old system had been
converted (and some new information was created. e.g.,  retrospective child-care credits) into
3the format of the new system, account statements could be sent out to the entire covered
population. This occurred in early 1999.
Individuals make their first choices of private funds with their second-pillar accounts in the
autumn of year 2000. They will choose from around 500 privately managed funds for
investment of their accumulated capital. Thereafter,  new contributions will be accrued
annually, and individuals will be allowed to change funds at their own discretion.
The first benefit computed according to the new rules can be paid on January  1, 2001. The
first recipient would be a person born in 1938, the first age cohort covered by the new rules,
and retiring at the age of 63. Assuming people keep with current practices, the first large age
cohort claiming the new benefits will be composed of persons born in 1938 when they turn 65
in the year 2003.
There is a gradual transition into the new system, beginning with persons born in 1938 and
ending with persons born in 1953. Persons born in 1934 will receive 20 percent of their
benefit from the new system and 80 percent from the old system. These proportions change by
5 percent per year for each younger age, and persons born in 1954 and later are completely
within the new system.
Finally,  in order to have a complete picture,  it is important to note that a typical employee in
Sweden is also covered by collectively bargained group insurance. Until the reform o.f the
public system, these benefits were based on defined-benefit schemes. With the reform of the
public system, the major occupational-based group schemes, covering about 85 percent of the
labor force. have begun to convert into advance-funded defined-contribution, to coincide with
the public scheme. The blue-collar workers (roughly 25 percent of the labor force) xkere the
first to convert, in 1998. By the end of 2000 just about all employees, the main exception
being those employed by the state, will have some degree of coverage based on an advance-
funded defined contribution scheme in their negotiated (occupational) scheme, where they
choose their own provider, with contributions of 2 - 4.5 percent of earnings (see figure).
Old-age Pension Insurance after the Reform
Contribution  rates  on  earnings,  net  of  contributions
Negotiated schemes  2.0-4.5  percent  Advance Funded DC
Privately managed




4Part II  Defined-Contribution PAYG with Notional Accounts
1  The  Basic  Idea
The basic idea of the pay-as-you-go system based on defined contributions with individual
notional accounts (NDC) is that of underlying conventional defined contribution insurance
schemes. Contributions based on a defined contribution rate applied to earnings from work are
recorded on individual accounts. Account values represent a claim on a future pension.  There
is no advance funding, as opposed to in what we normally call a defined contribution. For this
reason, we say that the system is notional defined contribution. Instead, contributions flowing
into the system are used to finance current pension obligations,  in the traditional  PAYG
manner.
The account value at the close of any current year consists of contributions during the year to
date plus the account value from the previous year, the latter indexed to the rate of growth of
covered earnings. Continuous indexation of account values from all years means that
contributions accredited in earlier years have the same relative weight as those earned in later
years. In the most straight-forward version of this model, an annuity is calculated by dividing
the capital balance at the chosen time of retirement by average (unisex) life expectancy for





The demographic instability created by an aging society is counteracted automatically by a
change in the life expectancy factor. The system is actuarial in nature. The individual can
handle the increasing life expectancy factor by working and contributing more or by
postponing his/her annuity claim a little longer.
As the idea has been developed in Sweden, the annuity also includes an imputed real rate of
return of 1.6 percent. This is equivalent to giving the capital in the account a real rate of
return for a specified time, determined by life expectancy. This front-loading gives people a
share of real economic growth in advance, and provides a higher initial benefit than they
would have been entitled to under a straightforward application of the NDC system with wage
indexation of benefits. The amount of the annuity will not be fixed, however, since benefits
will be adjusted annually both for changes in the CPI and for the discrepancy between actual
real earnings growth and the 1.6 percent used to compute the annuity. Appendix  1 discusses
the calculation of the annuity and indexation in greater detail.
Front-loading the annuity "moves" future income into the present, given that the alternative
would have been to wage-index the annuity. With wage indexation, the annuity would increase
5in value a little each year throughout the retirement  career.  A wage-indexed annuity costs a
certain amount of money over a given life expectancy profile.  Front-loading the annuity with
"expected real growth"  is a way to shift some of this fixed sum of money into the initial
retirement years.  but at a price: compared with normal wage indexation, the benefit will be
relatively lower towards the end of retirement.  This procedure is consistent with an
assumption that people would rather have more money now than later,  i.e.,  positive time
preference. The figure below illustrates the difference between front-loading the annuity with
an assumed real growth rate and annual indexation of the annuity to the equivalent growth in
the real wage, given that the annuities will be price-indexed in both cases.
Front-loading compared to wage indexation
Annuirv without
Front-loaded annuity based  on  front-loading. but
with annual  real wage
B  \  1.6 percent annual growth.  indexation of 1.6
e  percent. on top of
e
neiein  price  indexation.
An illustration of NDC accounts
The idea of how the notional account is built up during working years and how a pension is
calculated upon retirement is illustrated with an example in Table 1. In the example, the
contribution rate is assumed to be 18.5 percent.  The calculations assume that the individual
does not earn any income or pay contributions  until age 22 and that from this age he' she
works continuously until retirement with nominal earnings that grow at an average rate of 2
percent per annum. In the example, the individual's  rate of wage growth also happens to
coincide with the rate of growth of the economy-wide wage. which is used in the example for
indexation of notional capital. Of course,  in practice individual wage growth will seldom
coincide with the economy-wide growth rate. The annuity is calculated for a Swede born in
1975, based on the projected life expectancy of this person from age 61, etc. Note that unisex
life expectancy is already projected to be almost 21 years from age 65 for a person born 1975.
This means that for a person beginning work at age 22, the working period if it stops at age
62 will be only twice the number of years of retirement.
6Table 1. NDC.  An example  with an individual  who begins  work at 22 and works every  year until  he/she decides  to retire
fully at sometime  between  age 61 and 70. Conmtribution  rate on earnings=18.5  %.  Values  in US dollars.
Unisex  life
Earnings.  expectancy  Annuity.
Individual  Unisex  life  Annuity.  Replacement and  1.6%  Based  on fie  Replacement
growth  of 2  Capital  Capital  expectancy.  Based  rate.  %  of  growth.  expectancy and  rate.  %  of
% per  index.  2 %  balance.  Swede born  solely on fife  eamings last  Swede born  a real return of  earnings last
Age  annum  per annum  End of year  1975  expectancy  year  1975  1 6%  year
22  27061  1.082  5006
23  27602  1.104  10213
24  28154  1 126  15626
60  57432  2.296  414368
61  58580  2 342  433493  24.24  17096  0.30  19.69  21043  0.37
62  59752  2.389  453217  23.41  18516  0.32  19.14  22654  0.39
63  60947  2.437  473557  22.59  20061  0.34  18.58  24397  0.41
64  62166  2.486  494528  21.78  21746  0.36  18.02  26287  0.43
65  63409  2.535  516150  20.97  23588  0.38  17.45  28342  0 46
66  64677  2.586  538438  20.16  25603  0.40  16.88  30580  0 48
67  65971  2.638  561411  19.36  27814  043  16.30  33024  0.51
68  67290  2.691  585088  18.55  30262  0.46  15.72  35716  0.54
69  68636  2.744  609488  17.76  32944  0.49  15.14  38654  0.57
70  70009  2.799  634629  16 96  35927  0.52  14.54  41906  0.61
It makes a considerable difference if the benefit is front-loaded using the real growth rate of
1.6 percent in the calculation of the annuity. At the age of 65, the benefit is about
5,000 dollars greater, according to Table 1.
The benefit level and replacement rate (compared with earnings the year prior to retirement)
increase as (i) notional capital increases for each additional year individuals work and
contribute, (ii) as the capital balance from the previous year is indexed up and (iii) as the
retirement and, hence, payment period decreases.  It is worth noting that, for the older worker,
indexation of capital from the previous year can provide a larger increment to the capital
balance than contributions from working an additional year. In other words,  there is always
much to be gained by postponing a benefit claim and continuing to work, even with reduced
hours or a lower hourly wage.
A word of caution about replacement  rates
Replacement rates provide us with a picture of the income standard of the retiree relative to
his/her standard prior to retirement and for this reason are of general interest.  Nevertheless,
there are two good reasons to be cautious about replacement rates, including those shown
here.
First,  in many countries,  including Sweden, tax rates have some degree of built-in
progression. For this reason, individual earnings,  which are normally higher than retirement
7income, may be taxed at a higher rate than the same individual's  pension income. This gives
an after-tax replacement rate that is higher than the pre-tax replacement rate.
Second, if we are examining pre-tax replacement rates, as we often do (since complex tax
systems can make it difficult to provide simple illustrations), it makes a difference what we
assume about earnings growth towards the end of the working career. Typically, earnings
profiles flatten out as we age, even if there is overall real wage growth. Table 2 illustrates that
simply letting earnings remain constant after age 60, instead of assuming that they continue to
increase, makes a big difference for the calculated replacement rate - but little difference for
the amount of the benefit at retirement.
Table  2. Replacement  rates  are a poor guage  of coverage.  They
depend  greatly on end-career  earnings,  as this table  illustrates. (This
example  is based on Table  1.)
Annuity based  Replacement Annuity  Replacement
solely on life  rate  with 1.6  %  rate
Age  expectancy  real  growth
Individual  eamings growth of 2 % throughout  career
62  20368  0.35  24919  0.43
63  22019  0.37  26777  0.45
64  23817  0.39  28790  0.47
65  25782  0.41  30978  0.50
66  27930  0.44  33360  0.53
67  30286  0.47  35959  0.56
68  32893  0.50  38821  0.59
Individual  eamings growth of 2 % through age 60,
but no change thereafter
62  20359  0.35  24908  0.43
63  21990  0.38  26742  0.47
64  23757  0.41  28717  0.50
65  25676  0.45  30851  0.54
66  27763  0.48  33161  0.58
67  30040  0.52  35667  0.62
68  32545  0.57  38411  0.67
Overall replacement  rates - NDC, 2"n  pillar and occupational schemes
The NDC and 2nd pillar components of the public pension scheme are both account systems.
From the point of view of the individual, the only difference - potentially - is in the rate of
return. During the past 50 years,  the real yield on equities has been around 8 percent. Bonds
8have yielded 2-3 percent. Real economic growth was around 2 percent in the two decades
preceding the deep recession in 1991-1994, during which the wage sum decreased by around
10 percent.  Thereafter, real growth has been well over 2 percent, on average.
Table 3 provides an illustration of what the NDC, 2nd pillar and occupational schemes together
can mean for the "typical"  individual, in this case a blue-collar worker.  The calculations are
based on the same assumptions as those underlying Table 1 - i.e., for an individual born in
1975 who works from age 22 and with a projected life expectancy according to the figures in
Table  1. Earnings are assumed to grow throughout the individual's earnings career at a real
rate of 2 percent per year. Given the present design of the "semi-mandatory"  negotiated
schemes, 2 percent is the smallest advance-funded DC contribution an individual can have,
while some municipal employees will have as much as 4.5 percent.  It is possible to have
various  mixes of bonds and equities, and, based on historical results, different rates of return,
also depending on individual choice and market performance. Table 3 shows replacement rates
for three rates of return, and assuming that the contribution rate to the negotiated scheme is 2
percent.
The total contribution rate for all three schemes together is 20.5 percent,  with 4.5 percentage
points going to financial account schemes. As is obvious, the rate of return makes a big
difference.  At age 65, a real rate of return of 2 percent overall gives a replacement rate of 51
percent,  which is the same as what the NDC system would deliver with a contribution rate of
20.5 percent.  With a 5 percent real rate of return on financial funds, the replacement rate
increases to over 60 percent. With the highly optimistic rate of return of 8 percent (which
implies that the worker chooses a 100 percent equity fund), the result is still better,  but less
likely to occur.
What is important is that the overall result for the typical individual in Sweden will resemble
that illustrated in Table 3. Table 3 shows the relative proportions of the systems taken
together,  with various rate-of-return assumptions. Of course,  with a flat earnings profile, as
we have illustrated above, replacement rates would look better as the individual gets older -
although the final annuities themselves are hardly affected by a slightly lower level of
contributions.  Once again, it is important to keep this point in mind.
9Table  3. Replacement  rates  under  different  rates  of return.
Public  Second  Pillar  (2.5%)  + Group  Total.  Public PAYG  and  Second Pillar
PAYG  Occupational  (2.0%)  plus  Group Occupational
Contribution Return of:  Return  of:
Age  rate of 16 %  2%  5%  8%  2%  5%  8%
61  0.32  0.09  0.16  0.32  0.41  0.48  0.64
62  0.33  0.09  0.17  0.35  0.43  0.51  0.69
63  0.35  0.10  0.19  0.39  0.45  0.54  0.74
64  0.37  0.10  0.20  0.43  0.48  0.58  0.80
65  0.39  0.11  0.22  0.47  0.51  0.61  0.86
66  0.42  0.12  0.23  0.52  0.53  0.65  0.93
67  0.44  0.12  0.25  0.57  0.57  0.69  1.01
68  0.47  0.13  0.27  0.63  0.60  0.74  1.09
69  0.50  0.14  0.29  0.69  0.64  0.79  1.19
70  0.53  0.15  0.32  0.76  0.68  0.85  1.29
Note.  The  individual's  earnings  are assumed  to grow  at a real rate  of 2 % per  year throughout  the  earnings  career
The  rate of growth  for indexation  of capital  in the  PAYG system  is 2 %. The  pay-as-you-go,  second  pillar  and grouD
occupational  annuities  are all based  on unisex  life expectancy  and a real rate of return  on capital  from  retirement  of 1.6  %.
2  Features  of the NDC Scheme
The system is fair
A fundamental feature of the NDC model is that it is fair. For two persons working in
identical jobs - or more generally in careers with identical earnings profiles - the person with
a longer earnings history and, consequently. who has contributed more, will receive a
proportionately higher benefit.
Similarly, a person whose lifetime earnings stream is higher,  for example resulting from a
longer period of education, but who is born at the same time and retires at the same time as
his lower income neighbor, will receive a higher benefit.
The system accommodates redistribution
Traditionally, the notion of fairness in social security has also been associated with
redistributive goals. The NDC account framework provides a framework that can be used for
many redistributive aims. Money can be transferred into the NDC  system to finance "rights"
that give rise to additions to individual accounts. In the Swedish reform, rights are granted for
time spent in military conscription,  care of younger children,  higher education, and
compensated days of sickness and unemployment, as well as disability. These credits will be
discussed in greater detail below. Note that financed  rights can also be credited to 2"i pillar
financial accounts - and are in the Swedish scheme.
10Annuities  adjust to changing  life expectancy
In the more advanced economies, improvements in dietary, exercise and living habits, better
working conditions and advancements in medical care have all led to improvements in life
expectancy,  which are continuing to rise.  Although improvements in life expectancy have been
absent in some countries, in time they are inevitable in all countries. For this reason,  it is
important for the pension system to respond smoothly to improvements in longevity.
This is where the NDC scheme is superior to many defined benefit schemes, as they are
usually designed. Namely, a serious problem with standard defined-benefit systems is that they
typically promise a full benefit at a fixed retirement age. Ideally, the full-benefit retirement
age in a defined-benefit system would be adjusted automatically with changes in life
expectancy - but this should be made known long enough in advance to give people time to
adapt. Governments are understandably reluctant to change their promises as life expectancy
changes. In fact, the failure to adjust regularly for increases in life expectancy has contributed
to the cost crises that many national social security systems are facing today.
One of the most appealing characteristics of the NDC system is, then, that the annuity
responds automatically to the financial pressure created by an aging population.  For any given
amount of accumulated capital, a benefit is less at a given retirement age the greater the length
of life expectancy. Life expectancy changes slowly, and current life-expectancy projections are
something people can and - in the Swedish framework - will be informed about. They can
take this information into account in formulating their decisions about work, retirement and
personal saving.
Figures  1-4 illustrate the effects of increasing life expectancy for younger birth cohorts.
Between the mid-1950s and the turn of the century, unisex life expectancy increased at the rate
of about one year every ten years  in Sweden. Presently, the projected change in life
expectancy between persons born in 1945 and 1975 is around two and a half years.  The
calculations are based on the same assumptions as those elaborated in Table  1. The only
difference is that the values for projected life expectancy change with the age cohort.
In sum, the fact that newly granted benefit levels change with changes in life expectancy
provides an incentive for people to spend more time in the labor force as average life
expectancy increases. This contributes to maintaining the long-term financial stability of the
overall system with an aging population.
11Figure 1. Replacement  rates
Earmings  growth  of 2r/o  until reti  rement
Annuity  based  solely  on life expectancy.  Increasing  life
expectancy  for younger  birth cohorts.
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Figure 2. Replacement  rates
Eamings growth of 20/o  until retirement
Annuity  based  on  life expectancy  and  1.6e/o  real  return.
Increasing  life expectancy  for younger  cohorts.
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Figure 3. Replacement  rates.
No  eamings  growth  from age 61.
Annuity  based  solely  on life  expectancy.  Increasing  life
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12Figure  4. Replacement  rates
No  eamings  growth  from  age 61.
Annuity  based  on life  expectancy  and  1.6%  real  return.
Increasing  life  expectancy  for younger  birth  cohorts
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Flexible  retirement is made easy
Notional accounts grow in the manner described above until the individual chooses to retire
sometime after the statutory minimum retirement age. People are free to choose partial or full
retirement at any age above the statutory minimum. In principle, a partial benefit claim could
be any percentage of a full claim. In Sweden choices will be limited to 25 percent, 50 percent,
75 percent or a full annuity. With partial retirement  the individual can continue to work and
accumulate additional notional capital from contributions on earnings, and hence, enhance the
value of a recalculated pension upon full retirement.  A recalculation can be made any number
of times.
In other words, the NDC account scheme system makes retreating gradually from the labor
force easy. Work and earnings can be combined in any way with an annuity, and all new
contributions count towards a recalculated annuity. In occupations where early retirement
might be the rule rather than the exception, occupational schemes could provide various
choices for programmed withdrawal that could be combined with the social insurance benefit
or taken for a period instead of it.
Finally, there is a tendency in Sweden, as in many other countries, for employers to buy out
employees before they reach the minimum retirement age in the public system. A strong
argument for increasing the minimum age in the public system, as life expectancy increases, is
to make this practice more expensive and thereby encourage  employers (and employees) to set
their sights on a higher normal exit age for retirement.
133  Some NDC Design Issues
Setting the minimum retirement  age
It is important to set the minimum retirement age with respect to two interrelated
considerations. The first is that the purpose of mandatory social insurance is to provide an
adequate earnings replacement rate. The benefit amount to which people are entitled in both
the NDC and financial account systems is determined by life expectancy at retirement. The
longer the life expectancy. the smaller the benefit will be. It is important to set the minimum
age high enough to provide an adequate benefit for the typical claimant.  If this is not the case,
some people will enter into permanent old-age poverty.
Given the long life expectancies of Swedes (presently unisex life expectancy is close to 22
years from age 61, with women expected to live about 5 years longer than men) it is not clear
that Swedish politicians gave this matter enough thought. A person who works 40 years to age
61 will spend more than a third of his/her adult life in retirement.  Although the cost is neutral
for the system, all other things being equal, the benefit amount is around 30 percent higher at
age 65 than at age 61.
For Sweden, there is a case for setting the minimum age higher - at 63-65 - in order to force
people to remain longer at work in order to get a good lifetime benefit. This ought to be one
of the goals of further reform work in Sweden. Persons entitled to a disability benefit, or who
have supplementary occupational benefits covering earlier retirement,  would then receive
income replacement at an earlier age through these channels.
Should benefits be recalculatedfor changing life expectancy?
Life expectancy changes throughout our lives, including, of course, the period after the
annuity has been granted.  Should benefits that have already been granted be recalculated as life
expectancy increases beyond what it was at the time of the calculation? In principle, financial
stability requires that it should; otherwise, a source of instability is introduced into the system.
There are several possible responses to this problem.  One is to adjust all benefits on a regular
basis as changes in life expectancy become known. This means that people have to get used to
small continuous changes. Another approach is to take expected future changes - estimated
conservatively - into consideration in calculating the initial level of the benefit. This sort of a
projection would be based on a long-term estimate that would be gradually changed. The latter
approach is more appealing in that it suggests a once-and-for-all calculation of the annuity.
The  floor and ceiling  for covered  earnings
It is not reasonable to cover all earnings - from the smallest to the largest. Persons with very
high earnings should be entitled to make private decisions about how much insurance to
14purchase. A lowest level is usually desirable for reasons of administration. How can the floor
and ceiling be determined?
A practical way to set the minimum is to put it at the level of earnings above which people are
required to report their earnings for income tax purposes. This is the approach taken in
Sweden. The ceiling should be high enough to provide an adequate retirement standard for the
average worker, but low enough to leave room for individual variation in choosing optimal
lifetime patterns for saving and consumption.  Both the floor and the ceiling should be indexed
to per capita wage growth so that they will maintain their relative values. The ceiling in the
Swedish scheme is roughly 50 percent above the average wage, which is relatively low. The
ceiling is indexed to average wage growth from the year 2002 onward.
Should  voluntary contributions  be allowed?
Should people be allowed to contribute more into the NDC scheme voluntarily? Of course this
is possible in principle. In practice,  however, it makes more sense to put voluntary
contributions into financial accounts, and normally there will be many private insurance
options available for this purpose.  It will not be possible to make voluntary contributions into
the Swedish public schemes.
Periods of unemployment,  sickness and disability
Contributions can be paid into both the PAYG and 2nd pillar funded components of the
mandatory public old-age pension system to cover periods of compensated unemployment,
sickness, work injury and disability. This has the additional advantage of forcing these systems
to include both the direct costs of program-related benefits and the indirect cost of contributing
to the PAYG and funded accounts in the old-age system. The cost of the transfers from the
various income-replacement schemes is a part of their total cost to society, and for this reason
their contributions to the old-age system are really a component of social policy.
In principle, any amount can be credited to an individual pension account, using any form of
rule, and it is possible to make the rules more or less generous as time goes on, without
affecting the acquired rights (notional or financial capital) accredited in the past. Note also that
it is important that financial transfers to the old-age pension system actually be made, since
without them there is no financial backing for these rights.
In Sweden, benefits replacing earnings during sickness and unemployment will be treated as
earned income, and 18.5 percent of these amounts give pension rights and will be accredited to
individuals and transferred  from these systems into individual accounts in the pension system.
Similarly, the earnings replaced by compensation for work injury and disability will provide
the basis for accrediting individual accounts. Appendix 2 discusses possible models for dealing
with disability.
15Child care and other social  policy motives  for enhancing pension accounts
Pension rights can be given for activities other than market activities yielding earnings or
social insurance replacing these earnings. Obvious examples are time spent caring for younger
children and in military conscription. Rights accredited for military conscription can be based
on a fictitious wage, a minimum wage etc.
There are several issues associated with constructing a child-care credit. The issues are how to
compensate, for how long, whether persons have to be wholly out of the labor force to obtain
a credit,  whether the credit can be taken by either parent, and whether this latter decision is
made by the parents themselves.
The simplest child-credit model is to grant a sum (credit) per child, regardless of whether the
mother (or father) works or not. More complicated models can also be devised, and Sweden
has pursued this path.
In Sweden the parent with the lowest earnings in the year(s) in question will be automatically
accredited with child-care pension rights, unless the parents choose otherwise. Child-care
earnings"  will be imputed according to the most favorable of the following three
computations:
*  a supplement equal to 75 percent of average earnings for all covered persons
*  a supplement up to the individual's own earnings the year prior to child birth
*  a supplement consisting of a fixed amount, indexed in time to the (covered) wage per
capita
Each is targeted to a specific type of recipient. The first model covers persons without
earnings imrnediately prior to childbirth. The second replaces own earnings for a person who
leaves her(his) job after childbirth and is wholly or predominantly at home. It also provides a
supplement for someone who works less than he/she did prior to childbirth.  The third provides
an extra supplement after return to work - thus not discriminating against those women(men)
who return shortly (in Sweden usually after 8-12 months) with earnings equal to or higher than
those prior to childbirth.
For each child, the parent has the right to four years of imputed earnings according to the most
favorable of the three models. If women continue to bear close to two children and,  as is
common, give birth to their second child within 2-3 years after giving birth to the first child,
one of the above forms of credit will typically be received during 6-7 years.  It is estimated that
an average Swedish woman can expect to have her benefits enhanced by close to  10 percent
from pension credits for child-care years. On average,  she will then have about the same
number of earnings years as a typical man.
Contributions will be paid from the state budget for child-care years, conscripted military
service (based on imputed earnings equivalent to 50 percent of the average covered wage) and
16years in higher education - the latter provision was enacted in spite of the strong arguments
against it.3 The military and educational credits will be very small, however.
Survivors
An individual life can be separated into an economically active and a retirement period, the
latter corresponding to the period beginning with the average retirement  age. Deaths occurring
up to the retirement age create a "surplus"  in the system that can be utilized in a number of
ways. The most obvious of these are to create:
*  a survivor benefit for young (under the pension age) survivors,
*  a higher old-age benefit, or
*  a general reserve to cover imperfections in the actual system design.
The second option is that which has been chosen for the Swedish scheme. This option requires
keeping track of the notional capital of the deceased and distributing it proportionately to the
accounts of survivors.
Gender  Issues
In most countries the average woman earns less than the average man for a number of reasons.
Among these are the choice to work fewer hours per week, employment in occupations with
lower wage and salary levels, and, over the life cycle, fewer years in full-time work because
of years spent caring for children. What are the implications within the structural framework
discussed here'?
Bearing and raising children is an important activity that society normally wants to promote.
On this premise a mandatory pension system should not disfavor persons who spend time out
of the labor force during early child-care years.  It is easy to argue that time spent at home for
care of younger children should be compensated by transferring money from the state budget
to the account systems to provide financial backing for additional pension rights in the NDC
and 2nd pillar schemes. The Swedish approach has already been described above.
Should capital be redistributed from men to women to compensate for the gender-specific
wage bias? The annuity in both the NDC and financial account systems is calculated on the
basis of life expectancy without regard to gender.  In most countries,  though,  women live
considerably longer than men. For this reason alone, there is already a considerable built-in
transfer of capital to women; an additional transfer is provided by the childbirth credit.
Nevertheless, lower earnings generate lower account values, and consequently a lower
pension.  This effect could be neutralized by adjusting individual accounts. An argument
against incorporating such a mechanism into the scheme, however,  is that we do not know
Namxe . higher  Cducat  ioni  or ads  anced  training  should  ! ciId  an  carnini1gs  prCeii  LIrn  oz r thc I i  ic  I  e. compensati  ig X ear lo.t htr timc spent
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17today what the relative earnings of men and women will be in the coming decades. For this
reason, in the Swedish scheme, this sort of transfer will not be made.
The  "Rate of Return " in the NDC Account  System
The contribution wage sum and the rate of growth of this sum determine the capacity to
finance benefits. The contribution wage sum can be viewed as the product of the per capita
wage and the number of contributors. Wage sum indexation always moves the system in the
direction of financial stability. Per capita wage growth reflects the growth in productivity, but
not changes in the size of the labor force. For this reason,  per-capita wage indexation does not
yield financial stability if wage growth  is greater than the growth of the contribution wage
sum.
A birth rate lower than that needed to reproduce the population or net migration out of the
country are demographic factors that can lead to a decline in the labor force over time, and
thus reduce the system's  financial capacity if per-capita wage indexation is chosen.
Nevertheless, the Swedish scheme has per-capita wage indexation. However, in addition, the
system is provided with a balance mechanism that operates as a downside brake. It is based on
the relationship between the actual debt and the "theoretical"  debt with wage sum indexation
and takes the reserve fund into account.  This mechanism is described in more detail below
under the section on financial stability.
Transition from  the old system
The question of how to go from the old to the new system is one of the most difficult of all
design issues. There are two principal questions. The first is how to convert rights acquired
under the old system. The second is, which age cohorts should be included in the new system'?
Rights earned up to the time of the reform should be honored, to the extent possible. It may
not be a simple matter to place a value on these rights in practice.  The Swedish defined-benefit
system provides an example of the problems that might arise. Benefits in the income-related
ATP-component are based on the average of the best fifteen years of earnings of a maximum
30 years needed to receive a full benefit.  We do not know when the best years have occurred
until all are accounted for. In principle, in terms of rights  in the pension system, people could
begin to work at age 35 and still qualify for a full benefit at age 65.
Availability of records is also a key issue. Sweden is fortunate in that there are computerized
historical earnings records from 1960. A person born  1938 (the first covered by the new
system) was 22 years old then, so very little history was unretrievable,  and, one could argue.
earnings histories prior  to the introduction of the ATP system in 1960 gave no rights in the
ATP-system anyway. In Sweden. earnings histories froml960  have been used to compute
NDC accounts for everyone covered by the new rules,  using the contribution rate of 18.5
18percent through  1994, before 2nJ pillar rights occur in 1995, and the contribution rate
excluding  the  2"d tier  rate thereafter. 4
Which birth cohorts should be covered in the new system'? Swedish politicians argued that a
short transition period would be unfair to persons who for one reason or another had planned
their careers so that they had not entered the labor force at an early age. Specifically, female
participation in the labor force has been increasing steadily since the end of the Second World
War. Women born around the 1940s were the first whose participation in the labor force
matched that of men (with the exception of an average of two years, which we can guess have
to do with childbearing). This suggests that in terms of gender neutrality,  a starting year
encompassing persons born 1938 and later was reasonable.
There is gradual transition for persons born 1938-1953. Persons born  1938 enter with 20
percent of their pension calculated according to the new rules and 80 percent according to the
old rules. The proportions change successively with increments of 5 percent per year up to
persons born 1954 who are entirely in the new system.
Calculations show that if earnings per capita grow by over two per cent per annum, it is
generally better to be in the new system - rather than the old system with price indexation.
Similarly, the second pillar real rate of return is likely to be well over two per cent during the
next decades. In sum, there is a strong probability that an inmnediate transition for persons
born 1938 (or perhaps 1940) would have provided better - and potentially much better -
benefits for the vast majority of pensioners now covered by the long transition.  Moreover, an
immediate transition would also have afforded more financial stability in the event that the
downside scenario - i.e., continuous real growth of 0.5-1.5 percent - were to occur.  Seen in
this perspective, the long transition is highly questionable.
Finally, even persons born before 1938, most of whom are already pensioners.  will notice a
difference - at least in principle, if not in practice. This is because the flat-rate folkpension  in
the old system will to be converted into a guarantee and the extra tax deduction for all
pensioners will be eliminated, but with compensation provided through the construction of the
guarantee.
Exportability  of benefits
The NDC and 2"d  pillar financial account benefits are based on contributions from earnings
and in principle should (and in Sweden in practice will) be exportable to persons who have
earned rights but are not residing in the country during retirement.  On the other hand, the
guarantee can and, it can be argued, ought to be restricted to residents. This implies also that
4Other  procedures  for computing  acquired  rights have been  devised  in countries  where earnings  histories  do not
exist or are not a good  measure  of contributions.  For example, Latvia  has used the number  of recorded  service
years and a more current measure  of earnings.  Poland  has devised  a formula  to convert acquired  DB  rights up to
the time  of the reform into initial  capital.
19it should be prorated according to the number of years of residence prior to reaching the
qualification age.
4  A Guarantee  for the Poor
The overallframework  and design issues
In Sweden, as in many other countries,  the safety net of last resort for the very poor is
financial social assistance, and for persons in need of special care,  various care arrarngements.
These are provided at the municipal level. Social assistance is means-tested. Low-income
families and pensioners may also qualify for untaxed housing allowances, which are both
means-tested and related to housing-standard norms for families of different sizes. Disability
and old-age pensioners also have these options if their pensions are so low that they qualify for
extra assistance.
Prior to the reform,  the universal basic pension (folkpension), even together with a small ATP
benefit, may have been below the Social Board's  defined minimum standard for a single or
married person. In this case the individual would have been entitled to a means-tested housing
allowance. Normally the pensioner with combined benefits reaching the "housing allowance
level" has a living standard roughly equivalent to the defined minimum. On the other hand, at
the threshold, as the ATP benefit increased in size, the folkpension  supplement and housing
allowance decreased,  so that total income remained practically unchanged.  Hence, around the
tax threshold, the composition of disposable income - although not its level - could change
considerably.
The reform replaced this arrangement with a guaranteed minimum pension. The guaranteed
minimum is also now a gross amount,  i.e.,  a pre-tax benefit. The net, i.e.,  after-tax, benefit is
roughly equivalent to the folkpension,  including its supplement. With the reform, both present
and future pensioners will receive a guarantee benefit based on the new model. One aim of the
reform is to make the switch as neutral as possible to avoid ex post changes for persons
already receiving benefits. Since tax rates vary between municipalities, the highest tax rate was
used in calculating the conversion - thus creating "winners"  in low-tax municipalities.
Generally, there are two approaches to constructing  a guarantee. The first is to establish a flat-
rate guarantee. The alternative is to design the guarantee so that even persons with small NDC
benefits always receive more than a flat guarantee. This graduated guarantee has been adopted
in the Swedish reform.
There are also two general approaches to computing the amount of the guarantee with respect
to the recipient's  - or the recipient household's  - other earnings. The first is to apply a means
test, reducing the guarantee for other sources of income, including other, e.g..  third pillar or
private, pension benefits. This is clearly the most efficient use of public money, and the least
encouraging to "free-riding."  In the absence of means-testing, individuals are free to avoid
paying contributions and purchase private assets instead, or to have other sources of income,
20and still be entitled to the guarantee. In spite of these problems, however, the Swedish
politicians have generally favored a guarantee without regard to means, this alternative is the
one that will be implemented in Sweden.
In the Swedish scheme, a full guarantee can be claimed at the age of 65, with 40 years of
residence.  It will be reduced by 1/40 for each year under 40. It will also be reduced by about
11 percent for a married pensioner.
The guarantee and the 2 nd pillar
How can the guarantee be coordinated with a 2"d  pillar benefit that can be claimed separately
from the NDC benefit? Of course one approach is to avoid the problem by requiring people to
claim both benefits at the same time. If both are fixed annuities, then there is no coordination
problem. This approach is inflexible, however.  That is. it may be important to be able to claim
the 2nd  pillar annuity separately - for example the stock market may be down at the time a
claimant wants to claim the NDC annuity.
One approach to allowing flexibility is to impute a rate of return in calculating the value of
unclaimed 2nd pillar annuity. This requires accepting the fact that the imputed annuity will
undoubtedly not be the same as the actual annuity, once the account is converted. To avoid
this, in calculating the guarantee in Sweden, instead of using the actual 2nd pillar benefit, the 1SI
pillar NDC annuity will be calculated as if it were based on the total contribution rate,
encompassing the second pillar rate of 2.5 percent,  i.e.,  18.5 percent.  Since the second pillar
is relatively small in Sweden, the difference between these methods is also likely to be small in
practice.
For relative large 2"d  pillars, the Swedish method becomes more questionable if the aim is to
create an economically efficient guarantee (i.e.,  money is transferred to the very neediest
individuals). The alternative of using the current converted value as the imputed value may be
preferable.  Yet another alternative would be to require people to convert their 2nJ pillar benefit
in order to qualify for the guarantee.
5  Medium and Long-Term Financial Stability
Rising contribution rates with the old system
The major impetus for reform of the Swedish system was the threat of financial disaster. The old
system would have collapsed with permanent wage growth under 1 percent.  Even permanent
real growth around  1 percent per annum would have required steady increases in contribution
rates during the coming 30 years.  In addition,  increasing longevity has steadily contributed to
rising costs, and it is likely that people will continue to surprise us by living longer than
present estimates. Finally, Swedes, like their counterparts  in all OECD countries, have been
leaving the labor force earlier and earlier during the past couple of decades - even though they
are healthier by just about any objective measure. This trend contributes to long-term erosion
of the payment base.
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work force and/or increasing longevity after retirement, will be demonstrated in this section
with scenarios based on the two most recent official demographic projections  from Statistics
Sweden. The first scenario is the baseline scenario used in official calculations in 1994, when
the reform concept was passed by Parliament. The second scenario is from  1997, when the
reform was legislated.
In the short time interval between the computation of figures for 1994 and 1997, the survival
rates of both older men and women increased by several per cent. In part because of
persistently high unemployment, net immigration in the coming decade was adjusted
downwards by about 20 percent and the forecasted fertility rate was lowered from about 2.0 to
about 1.8 children per woman - which is still high by European standards.  The working-age
population is constant to slightly increasing in the 1994 scenario, which we call the optimistic
scenario. The 1997 scenario is more pessimistic. In this scenario there is a roughly constant
labor force over the first 30 years but a steady decline thereafter with the accumulating effects
of fewer births and lower net immigration.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate how these two demographic scenarios, together with three
assumptions about real per capita wage growth (annual rates of 1 percent.  2 percent and 3
percent),  affect the financial future of the public old-age pension system. The figures show the
development of expenditures for the income-related parts of both the old and new systems
(i.e.,  expenditures excluding the cost of the guarantees in the two systems). To achieve
comparability of the old and new systems, in the reformed system the rate of return in the 2nd
pillar has been set equal to the scenario rate of growth. This is tantamount to giving the new
NDC PAYG system a contribution rate of 18.5 percent. This contribution  level will also be
equivalent to the long-run cost of the NDC PAYG system, i.e., the ratio of actual expenditures
on benefits to the contribution base. A long-run contribution rate is also the target rate set for
the reformed system, within a "pure"  NDC framework.
Now, how does the old system perform with the different economic and demographic
scenarios'? Figure 5 shows that. in order to finance the old system with permanent real growth
of 1 percent per annum in the contribution base,  the contribution rate would have to rise to
24-27 percent by the year 2030, depending on whether the outcome resembled the "optimistic"
or "pessimistic"  demographic scenario. In the pessimistic scenario, the contribution rate
needed to pay benefits at the time children born in the late 1980s become pensioners hovers
around 29 percent.  This sort of increase is not reasonable. Without reform of the old system.
the alternative would undoubtedly have been repeated increases in the pension age, downward
adjustments in benefit levels or, most likely, both.
Growth of 2 percent provides a much rosier picture of the old system. The pessimistic scenario
leads to a - still too high - contribution rate of around 22 percent for much of the coming half
century. But with the optimistic demographic scenario, the cost of financing the old system
actually coincides roughly with the "target"  contribution rate of 18.5 percent set for the
reformed system. With consistent long-term real growth of 3 percent, the cost of the old
22system falls to the target of 18.5 percent during the coming half century even in the pessimistic
demographic scenario, and about 17.5 percent in the optimistic scenario.
Why does the old system respond so perversely to economic growth? Benefits are price-
indexed in the old system. This means that contribution costs fall as real wage growth rises.
Conversely, the burden on current workers increases as wage growth falls.
Probably no one believes that real wage growth will average 3 percent during the coming 50
years. These days many are even pessimistic about the prospects of maintaining real wage
growth as high as 2 percent over the next half decade. More importantly, with growth in real
per capita wage rates below 2 percent and/or an outcome resembling the pessimistic
demographic scenario, the old Swedish defined-benefit system would soon become
unaffordable. As I have stated in the introduction, this was the main impetus for reform.
The financial  stability of the reformed system
The new system is designed to maintain financial stability in the face of both economic and
demographic changes. If benefits are calculated to reflect longevity exactly (so that the factor
used to compute the annuity fluctuates randomly around the perfect-information outcome),  and
if indexation reflects exactly the development of the contribution wage sum, the ratio of
expenditures to the contribution base will fluctuate around the individual contribution rate of
18.5 percent.
The calculations in these figures assume that the NDC annuity is based on the exact longevity
outcome for a cohort and a real rate of return of 1.6 percent (in accordance with the Swedish
law). In addition, economic indexation is applied (also in accordance with the Swedish law),
so that actual benefits are adjusted annually for the difference between the annuity factor rate
of growth of 1.6 percent and the actual rate of growth. This mechanism keeps the system in
financial balance. For the individual pension, this results in an annual deduction of 0.010 -
0.016  =  -0.006 per year with real growth of 1 percent, but there will be an increment of
0.0200 - 0.0160  =  +  .004 per year with 2 percent real growth,  and 0.0300 - 0.016  =
+0.014  per year with 3 percent real growth. This economic indexation is also applied to
benefits granted under the old rules. Finally, for purposes of illustration, two forms of
"economic indexation" and indexation of notional capital are applied, per capita and wage-sum
indexation. With a stable labor force they should give the same result. With declining or
increasing labor forces,  the wage-sum index alone will keep the system in financial balance.5
This  is not exactly  true.  One can construct  examples with  substanrial  changes in the labor  force  where even the wage-sum  index may fall
slightly  short ot exact balance.  However.  it provides  an approximate  balance. whereas the per capita index fails entirely.  Thils will  he
demonistrated in a coming paper to he published in this series.
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24Figures 5 - 7 also demonstrate the central features of indexation in the NDC system. In the
long-run - around 2030, when the last beneficiaries of pre-reform benefits have died off, we
see that relatively extreme assumptions about the rate of real growth in the wage rate (I to 3
percent) all lead to about the same financial result.
What can we discern from the different demographic and labor market scenarios? With the
1994 demographic scenario the rate of growth in the wage sum is for all practical purposes the
same as the rate of growth in the per capita wage. As a result, the development of costs is
largely the same, regardless of the form of indexation applied. With the 1997 demographic
scenario, labor force growth falls off by about a tenth of a percent per year from around 2025.
As a result, with 2 percent per capita wage growth,  for example, the contribution wage sum
grows by only 1.9 percent. Per capita indexation of notional accounts and benefits means that
the cost of benefits increases faster than the contribution base, leading to a long-run increase in
costs and a growing financial deficit. With wage-sum indexation, financial balance is
maintained.
Finally, what is immediately clear from a quick glance at the three figures is that the new
system is inherently financially stable, whereas the old system yields very different financial
results depending on the economic and demographic scenario.
Automatic real-growth adjustment - "economic indexation" - of benefits acquired under thie
old system
It will take time before the majority of beneficiaries have benefits calculated according to the
new rules. For the coming two decades a significant part of benefits will have been calculated
according to the old formulas. How will financial crisis in the medium-term be averted, then?
The answer is that even benefits paid according to the old rules will be subject to a new form of
indexation. The mechanism to be employed is 'the economic adjustment factor," i.e., economic
indexation, described above.'
We have just seen that cost neutrality required a real per capita growth rate of over 2 percent
and an "optimistic" demographic forecast. With growth of 2 percent, benefits granted
according to the old benefit formulas actually cost more than they would have without reform.
One can wonder, then, why Swedish politicians would choose to increase benefits granted
under the old rules for per capita growth in the range of 1.6-2.0 percent over the coming three
decades. The answer is straightforward. They were not willing to provoke elderly voters -
i.e.,  persons on fixed incomes who usually have little chance of influencing their own
economic situation through work. At the time the decision was made, many thought that per
capita growth was more likely to fall well below 2 percent over the coming 20 years.
This method was first proposed to the government in a report from the National Social Insurance Board in 1989.
7  It is probably worth pointing out that when the Pensioni  Reform Commission of the 1980s presented its first voluminous report Swedish
economists  and politicians  alike all believed  in long-run growth of over 2 percent. Shortly thereafter, during the first four years of the 1990s.
with the collapse of the housing market and coimnercial banks, extreme recessioni set in and the wage sum declined by about 1I) percenit.  This
created a much miore  sober  atmosphere during the tiiie the refoirm  was being formlllated and discussed
25Increased longevity of old system (A  TP)  pensioners - generous transition  rules - is still a
source of financial instability in the medium term
There is another problem with the fact that benefits granted under the old system (with no
adjustment factor for increasing longevity) will account for a dominant share of costs for well
over two decades after the reform. There is no adjustment for increased longevity for benefits
granted according to the old rules - including part of the transition benefit based on the old
rules for persons born 1938-1953.
In addition, the large baby-boom cohorts of the 1940s, with part of their benefits calculated
according to the old rules,  create additional strain on finances. In principle, these costs can be
covered by the reserves that the system will take over from the old system. In practice,
whether the fund will suffice to cover the generous transition rules depends on how large a
sum is transferred to the state budget for partial compensation of additional costs associated
with the budget transfers for child-care years, disability, etc. For such a transfer is also a part
of the reform package. If an amount sufficient to cover the costs to the budget of budgetary
transfers  is moved from the present pension fund reserves to the treasury, it is likely that the
reserves will not be sufficient to cover costs of conmmitments  to persons born before 1950.
A large sum of money - the equivalent of about one year of benefit payments - will already
have been transferred from the pension fund to the state treasury by the year 2001. This
transfer has already been decided. A second transfer is to be made in 2001. If it is, the two
transfers together will decrease the total pension reserves by up to 50 percent.  What does this
mean for the generous transition rules?
If it turns out that politicians have been too generous to persons born in the late 1930s and
1940s, the "overly generous benefits" will be reduced by yet another index - the "pension-
debt adjustment mechanism."  This index corrects in the end all downside technical failings of
the system. What this means is that politicians have chosen generous transition rules for the
age cohorts of the 1930s and 1940s,  but have also chosen a mechanism 8 that probably will
gradually reduce benefits once these people have become pensioners.  In the final analysis this
feature may be judged by social and political historians to have been the major failing of the
reform.
The cost of the guarantee
The guarantee in the reformed system - financed separately from the general budget - costs
more in the new system than in the old system. Why? The pre-tax amount has been set so that
it will be neutral after the extra tax deduction for old-age pensioners  is abolished in the year
2001. However,  in order to do this for all, the gross amount has been set high enough so that
no one will lose due to high local tax rates. This meant using the highest local tax rate to
compute the conversion amount for all old-system pensioners.  In other words,  for many
existing pensioners the reform provides an improved benefit.
This mechanism  is explained  heolew-
26At the outset, the guarantee costs (gross) about 2.2 percent,  measured in terms of the
contribution base. About 30 percent of this cost will be collected as local taxes, however,
giving an after-tax cost of about 1.5 percent (and a tax-distribution problem between national
and local jurisdictions).  The guarantee will be price-indexed.  This means that as older
pensioners with relatively low ATP pensions die and new individuals begin to retire with
higher pensions, the need for the guarantee will decrease.  By the year 2015 it is expected to
cost about 1.2 percent (1.0 percent after tax) and by 2050 less than 0.5 percent (under 0.35
percent after tax) of the contribution base, if price indexation is maintained during all this
time.
Will the long-run cost of the guarantee really be so low? Probably not. The size of the
guarantee is a political decision, which is one of the main features of the reform. The door is
open for future political decisions about new distributional transfers through the tax-transfer
system, including "simply"  increasing the guarantee.
The contribution  base
It should be noted that the contribution base is not the same in the old and the new systems. In
accordance with the new rules, the contribution base includes transfers  into the system to
finance pension credit for disability, unemployment and insured sick leave, as well as for
child-care years for women. On the other hand the base has been narrowed because
contributions will no longer be assessed on earnings over the ceiling for the 50 percent of
contributions payable by employees,  and employer contributions on earnings over the ceiling
will go to the state treasury as a tax. The calculations in the above figures have been
performed according to the old rules for the old system and the new rules for the new system.
Long-run financial  equilibrium and reserves
Reserves created by large cohorts of workers are needed to help pay for benefits when these
cohorts retire. With a stable development of the labor force, the system will maintain its long-
run equilibrium financial balance - with reserves changing according to cohort size -
regardless of whether wage per-capita or wage-sum indexation is chosen. Demographically
driven declines/increases in the labor force will lead to financial disequilibrium with per-capita
wage indexation of notional capital and benefits.  Declines lead to lasting deficits and increases
to lasting surpluses. Wage-sum indexation largely avoids financial disequilibrium.
In the "pessimistic"  1997 scenario in Figures 5-7, where the labor force decreases slowly over
time, wage per-capita indexation of notional capital and benefits creates costs that on average
slightly exceed the equilibrium level of 18.5 percent.  This method has in fact been chosen by
the politicians designing the new Swedish system. To counteract this downside risk, the
Swedish system will include a "pension-debt adjustment mechanism"  (to be explained below);
in terms of the figures presented here, the system will react on the downside as if it were
wage-sumn  indexed.
27Financial stability in tIe face of lower mortality rates
Swedish politicians have made another decision that runs counter to long-term stability. If the
system were  I 00 percent consistent with its underlying principles, it would be necessary to
successively recalculate the pensions of all pensioners as life expectancy increases, or to attempt
to perform a sound actuarial forecast. As the Swedish law is presently specified. however,
pensions will not be adjusted once they have been granted. and they will not be based on a sound
actuarial forecast. Instead, the life-expectancy calculation will be based on an average of
observed outcomes prior to retirement.  The factor will be biased towards to produce benefit
levels that are persistently too high, thus creating an additional source of financial stress.
Calculations show that if people live on average 2.5 years longer in 2050, the fact that benefits
are not adjusted after retirement will cost around an additional 1 percent in contributions.
While this feature gives the starting generations a "free  ride,"  eventually the "pension-debt
adjustment mechanism" to be described below will bring the system into financial equilibrium.
This may be one of the first changes in the system once the public has really understood the
consequences and younger voters put pressure on politicians to bring an end to the some of the
transitional privileges given persons born before 1951.
A pension-debt adjustment mechanism
Now, what is the "pension-debt adjustment mechanism?" To deal with the built-in causes of
financial imbalance, an additional index will be created that reflects changes in the pension
debt. The principle is to calculate the ratio of the actual debt (for current workers and
pensioners) to the debt that would arise with wage-sum indexation and actual changes in
longevity, accounting for a measure of reserve fund liquidity. If the index falls below unity,
notional capital of workers and benefits are indexed downward to create equilibrium.
The long-run result is equivalent to using a true longevity indicator and wage-sum indexation.
This mechanism will cover the downside risk. Presently there is no political decision about
what to do with any "surplus"  fund. (Wage sum indexation even distributes the "surplus"
reserves as they occur, leaving no surplus above what fluctuating birth cohorts would require.)
So in practice,  the results for the Swedish system will be those described here under the
heading of wage-sum indexation.
Is the reform financially  neutral?
The question of whether the Swedish reform is financially neutral may be debated forever.
One conclusion, though, is easy to reach: compared with the risks involved in keeping the old
system, Sweden now has a system with a foreseeable long-run cost of 18.5 percent of the
contribution base - plus an additional cost (primarily) for child-care years. disability
recipients, compensated sick leave and compensated unemployment. The latter cost
components can still be regulated by political decision.
28What are the additional costs to the state budget? The cost of child-care years is estimated to
be around 0.8 percent of the wage bill with 2 children per mother (which according to the
present forecast is too high). 9 With the present disability rate, another estimated 1.5 percent of
the wage bill will be contributed from the general budget to finance the capital of disability
beneficiaries  in the new system. Presently, unemployment, including persons in training
programs financed by the unemployment system, is around 12 percent. Pension contributions
payable on compensation received by these persons represent an additional transfer from the
state budget to the pension system of roughly 2 percent of the wage bill. Clearly,  not only the
direct costs - but even the indirect costs in terms of accrued pension rights - of the present
high levels of unemployment and disability are extremely high. In my opinion, one of the
advantages of this transparent  "accounting"  system is that it reveals the true costs of
unemployment,  sickness and disability. This may help encourage politicians to consider the
structural changes that could reduce these costs.
With the present high levels of disability and unemployment, the additional cost to the state
budget for transfers to the old-age pension system is around 4.5 percent of the wage bill. Had
we based the estimate on average figures for the 1980s, the additional cost to the budget would
have been under 3 percent of the wage bill. Finally, there is the guarantee, which after the
initial transition period will cost 0.75 percent. This suggests a long-term cost to the state
budget of around  3.75 percent, if the unemployment rate is brought down to 5 percent.
The financial package involves two other features. One is the gradual abolishment of the
widow's  benefit (to be replaced largely by a benefit for male and female survivors with school-
aged children and a temporary benefit designed to give people a year to adjust to new
circumstances).  The other is, as I have already discussed, a large transfer of money from the
current reserves of the pension system to the state treasury. The former yields a long-run
saving of around 1 percent of the wage bill. With a market portfolio rate of return (5 percent),
the amount discussed for the transfer from the pension reserves would be equivalent to a
contribution rate of around 2.25 percent.  Together, these two sources amount to a contribution
rate of roughly 3.25 percent.
In sum, with a long-run unemployment rate of around 5 percent (including persons in labor
market training courses) and a 20-25 percent lower disability rate, there is an additional long-
run financial burden on the state budget equivalent to a contribution rate of 0.5 percent - or
perhaps  1 percent if we are less optimistic. However, we must keep in mind that, with afixed
contribution rate of 18.5 percent to the old-age pension system, the reform also avoids an
otherwise likely substantial increase in the contribution rate. In addition,  it helps to channel
reserves from the public system into the financial market.
The  2nd pillar and thte  development of total reserves in thle  public systems
There is a long-standing tradition in Sweden of considering the potential effect of a mandatory
PAYG pension system on personal and national saving. As early as the 1950s, when the
Fewer  children  per mother  and moare  time working  wheni children  arc vounig ci\e  lower  costs.
29Swedish ATP system was conceived, Swedish pension reformers were worried  about the
potential negative effect of a mandatory PAYG-system on private and,  hence, national saving.
To counteract an anticipated negative effect, from 1960 through  1990 more contributions  than
were needed on a current accounting PAYG basis were collected and funded. Econometric
studies of the period  1960-1980'c show that this mandatory (public) saving was also successful
in counteracting a drop in personal saving attributable to the ATP-system.
Presently, the reserves in the PAYG fund are about 40 percent of GDP and are sufficient to
pay over 5 years of current benefits. By 2035, after three decades of demographic pressure  -
mainly associated with the transition-age cohorts, who are not fully included in the new system
- reserves could decline to a much lower level, perhaps to around 5 - 10 percent of GDP.
Thereafter they will increase again, as indicated in the above figure.
As the PAYG reserves decline, the 2nd pillar reserves  will be increasing.  By the year 2025,
with a (very) conservative real rate of return of 1.5 percent per annum, they will be equivalent
to 25 percent of GDP. Hence, there will be no drop in the ratio of total pension reserves to
GDP. This was also one of the goals in introducing the 2nd pillar.
Part III  The Mandatory  Advance  Funded  2nd  Pillar  with
Individual  Privately  Managed  Accounts
1  Options  for Setting  Up the Advance-funded  2nd Pillar
Introduction
In a private insurance system individuals enter into contracts with insurance companies
whereby the terms of the contract are agreed to as specified and accepted by the participant.
One approach to mandating advance-funded insurance is to require by law that all employees
have such insurance, for example, based on a specific contribution rate on earnings.  The
insurance provider can be chosen by the emplover, as in Australia, or by the individual, as in
Chile,"'  and all transactions occur between employers/employees  and the insurance companies,
suggesting that disputes arising under these insurance arrangements should also be regulated
by statutes and procedures in civil law. The arrangements thus build on existing insurance
institutions; contracts are established between employers or individuals and fund managers and
insurance providers.
Alternatively, the system may be viewed as an integral part of the social security system.  In
this case a social security agency contracts with fund managers and insurance providers  on
behalf of the public sector as a collective group, thus moving the system from the civil to the
11)(  I  Mark-,>ki  -de  Pakmer  ( 1979),P  I,-]5L  r  1981  ) ;mid B,,g , 1983)
''The Nelt-eniploved  are  left to  participate  - voluntarily  -- on  their  own  behalf.
30public domain. This is the basic legal framework chosen for the Swedish system. After
considerable discussion, this alternative was seen as the most suitable path to follow, given
that the system is a part of the overall mandatory system for all persons residing in Sweden,
including self-employed individuals, and all earnings income in Sweden. This choice is
consistent with the general principle of mandatory social security: to redistribute lifetime
income so as to create an adequate stream of income for persons who because of advanced age
are no longer able to provide adequately for themselves.
The following sections describe considerations behind specific choices in constructing the
details of the Swedish 2nd  pillar.
Capital  accumulation  and insurance
At the time when the Swedish 2nd pillar scheme was being designed there were three principal
models in the international arena: Chile, Australia and the UK. There are several options for
setting up a mandatory advance-funded 2nd pillar scheme with privately managed individual
accounts. Each of these three countries developed a model that fit the initial conditions in that
country well. Sweden has developed yet another model - with the initial conditions in Sweden
as a point of departure. A useful approach to examining the options more generally is to view the
scheme as if it consisted of two periods, a period of capital accumulation and an insurance
period. This is the approach taken here.
The capital accumulation period  is the time during which individuals work and contribute to the
scheme from their earnings. Their contributions are transferred into an individual financial
account, to become a part of an investment portfolio. Exactly how this is accomplished has
turned out to be one of the major areas of innovation in the design of mandatory advance-funded
systems.
The insurance period begins when the individual chooses to retire. At this point. the individual
begins to make a withdrawal, according to some set of specified rules. Withdrawals can take
several forms: one is a lump-sum withdrawal. Another is a programmed  withdrawal following
certain specifications (conditions), an annuity or an annuity combined with a survivor benefit.
An annuity can also have a fixed or variable value. A variable annuity fluctuates in value with
the rate of return on the individual's  fund. If the insurance company is a mutual insurance
company, owned by its participants. it may provide a "fixed-rate"  annuity that increases in
value if the company's investments perform better than anticipated when the value of the
annuity was established."2 Insurance products may be a part of a package including both the
capital accumulation and insurance phases, or they can be separate.
In calculatiny  the value  ot the annuity. the insurance  provider needs  to estimate  both life expectancy  and the yield on remaining  capital.
Given  tie former. better  than  expected  fund performance  canl  justify  a honus.
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In the pension reform discussion in Sweden in the 1950s, an alternative similar to the model
introduced in Australia in 1992 was discussed as an alternative to the public PAYG ATP
scheme eventually implemented in 1960. This alternative, which would have taken existing
employer-based schemes as a point of departure,  did not re-enter into the 2n tier discussion in
the 1990s." 3 Instead, there was general agreement that the choice of investment manager
should rest with the individual and should not be limited only to funds associated with
insurance companies. Instead, all funds registered to do business in Sweden could be
considered for participation, although subject to more specific requirements regarding
information disclosure and, as it turned out,  administrative costs. These considerations meant
that the investment period in the emerging the Swedish model would resemble more the UK
model for opting out of the SERPS.
Another possibility, that of reducing the fund choices to one or a few public index funds, was
not politically acceptable to the non-socialist parties,  which viewed any undertaking to
construct a large public fund as an attempt to introduce "socialism through the back door."
This would also have led to a concentration of ownership to a few large funds, presumably
with a similar concentration in representation on boards of directors. Opening up the system to
the whole fund market,  which even in the mid-1990s potentially included several hundred
managers, appeared to be a good way to spread ownership and investment decisions.
There was less of a consensus from the outset on the organization of insurance provision.
Needless to say, the insurance market promoted the idea of competitive insurance providers,
while politicians across party lines favored the idea of a single (state) monopoly provider. The
logic of opting for the private insurance-market model is that it could lead to the development
of new insurance products. The logic of a single provider emerged from the aim of politicians
to specify the insurance products  in the mandatory 2nJ pillar scheme in the law, including the
use of unisex life expectancy in computing the insurance annuity.
Lump-sum withdrawals were not considered appropriate for social insurance, since the raison
d 'ere for the overall mandatory system is to prevent poverty in old age, thus implying that the
paternalistic state should provide a life annuity. On the other hand,  one of the requirements
imposed was that it should be possible to receive a partial or full benefit that could be
recalculated at some future date chosen by the individual, taking contributions from new
earnings during the benefit period into consideration  in the recalculation. This would help in
creating more flexibility for older workers.
The decision to legislate how insurance would be provided reduced the scope for potential
competitive advantage to administrative costs. It was not clear that it would be cheaper to let
private companies compete solely on this basis - as opposed to using some of the existing
`As  in Australia before 1992.  in Sweden  in the 1950s  the old-age  insurance  that existed  for private employees  was provided sporadically.  and
in Sweden  n(lrnially covered  only white collar workers. Generally speaking,  in the 1950s.  bluei-collar  workers had  only the flat-rate
Jofikpension  (a less than  subsistence  aniount)  provided  to everyone  at age  67.
32facilities of the social insurance administration in running the insurance "business."  Finally,
many Swedish politicians - across party lines - favored a state monopoly as a matter of
principle,  since the system was to be a part of the overall mandatory social insurance system.
In creating a state monopoly for insurance provision,  Sweden diverged from all three of the
existing 2"d  pillar models.
One aspect of the problem that received little attention in the political discussion was the
investment of funds accumulated by the monopoly during the annuity period for persons who
choose to withdraw their funds from their fund manager's  account to fund a fixed-rate annuity
with the monopoly provider.  In time the cumulative effect will be to create a large fund, and it
is likely that fund management will be awarded by contract to private companies on the basis
of competitive bidding.
The Swedish model closely resembles the UK model in another respect. In both countries, a
single tax authority collects all taxes and contributions,  including the contributions for social
security. Given that this institution already exists and has tax accounts for all individuals.
companies and organizations, and that the tax authority performs all of the other necessary
functions of money collecting (audits, judicial processes, etc.),  it was obvious that the same
collection structure should be used for 2"d pillar contributions.  The marginal cost would be
close to zero.
The details of the model as it will work in practice are described in a separate section below.
Table 4 compares the main features of the model developed and legislated for Sweden with the
Chilean,  Australian and UK models.
The Swedish  "clearinghouse " model of administration
A central question in the development of the Swedish model was how to set up the system so
as to minimize administration costs. It was generally held by those familiar with the Chilean
and UK systems that these generate high costs.  Was there a less costly alternative to these
models? With this objective the Swedish "clearing house" model of administration was
created.
The idea of the clearing house is to allow freedom of movement of money into and out of
funds at minimum expense. This is important in the Swedish system, since people are allowed
to invest in virtually all market funds, but at their own risk. (The question of guarantees as it
was addressed in Sweden is discussed separately below.) Because the participant bears the
consequences of his/her own decision,  it is important for him/her to be able to move money
from one fund to another within a 24-hour period. This model already existed in the financial
market, where there were private fund managers with more than one fund offering this service
within their own groups of funds. In the public clearing house, all individual transactions vis a
vis a fund are aggregated at the end of the day and transmitted as a net (purchases minus sales)
aggregate to the fund in question. The transaction price is determined by the fund value at the
time of the transaction.
33The clearing house keeps all the individual accounts of individual shares and fund share values
and has one aggregate account vis a vis each participating fund. The funds have no information
on individual participants. The latter should prevent personal soliciting of clients,  which is an
'unnecessary" cost. What people need to know to make fund choices is information on fund
performance, risks and administration costs. This can be made available to everyone in a
format that allows comparison. To this end, managers of funds seeking to participate in the
Swedish system are required to provide daily information on fund values. This information
must be available to everyone through the clearing house, by phone, fax, mail or internet
communication, and through the local insurance offices. Many large daily newspapers also
present information on the Swedish fund market.
The clearing house is a part of the social security administration,  although it has a separate
board of directors and its own managing director.  Year-end statements sunmmarizing  the
individual financial status in both the PAYG and 2nd pillar components of the system are
produced by the social insurance administration. Benefits will also be paid through the same
system, with the same statement, using the social insurance administration's  existing payment
routines, and general information on the system is available at local social insurance offices.
Mandatory Financial Account Models at the Time of the Swedish Reform  and the Swedish Model.
Who keeps  Number of funds/
Who chooses  Who collects  accountsisends  Who chooses  Who chooses  Insurance  Benefit
fund manager?  contributions? statements?  the funds?  annuity  provider?  provider(s)  forms
Chile  Worker  Private  Private  Each manager has  Retiree  Choice of leaving  Gender specific
1981  manager  manager  one fund. This  the account with  annu ty or
becomes the  the same manager  programmed
worker's fund  or purchasing an  withdrawal from
annuity from an  pensionable age. A
insurance  withd awal can be
company  exchanged for an
annui-y
Australia  Employer  Private  Private  If the manager  Retiree  Choice of leaving  Lump sum or
1992  manager  manager  manager  chosen by the  the account with  gender specific
empoyer has more  the same manager  annuity from age
than one fund, the  or purchasing an  55  Survivor benefit
worker chooses the  annuity from an  if the nstitution
fund  insurance  allows it
company
UK  Worker  Tax authority  Private  Managers provide  Retiree  Choice of leaving  Up to 25 0/0  lump
19S6  manager  more than one fund  the account with  sum andlor gender
choice  The worker  the same manager  specif c annuity
chooses the fund  or purchasing an  from pensionable
annuity from an  age to age 75
insurance  Possible survivor
company  beneft
Sweden  Worker  Tax authority  A public agency,  Worker chooses  Government  State  Unisexual annuity.
1995-2000  which is a part of  among (several  monopoly/part of  partia  or full from
the scocial  hundred) registered  social insurance  pensicnable age
insurance organi-  mutual funds  orgnaization  Possible survivor






The Swedish system contains no guarantees regarding the rate of return, nor are there any
additional regulations,  other than those required in general for operating a business in the
Swedish financial market. The laws regulating conditions for ownership of funds, e.g.,
required equity, where money is to be deposited physically (and the responsibilities of the
depository institution), rules on information disclosure and auditing requirements for financial
companies together provide a general guarantee. Fraud is a legal offense in any case, and is
prosecuted as such. In sum, in the Swedish 2nd pillar system, privately managed funds
entrusted with social insurance assets are subject to the general requirements of all funds
operating in the country. It is the responsibility of the public licensing and supervisory
authority to make sure that funds operate according to the law. Improper behavior can
constitute grounds for the supervisory authority to withdraw a fund's license, and in certain
cases to confiscate the owner's  equity.
Are more guarantees needed for the social insurance system? This is a question that is debated
internationally. Some argue in favor of a explicit guarantee against fraud as an additional
minimal guarantee for persons with privately managed mandatory saving, although it is not an
easy matter to construct appropriate legislation for this purpose. The only real sanction can be
confiscation of owner equity (and the threat of incarceration). This suggests that the amount of
owner capital required is an important indirect guarantee - as it sets the level of the owner's
stakes.
Some countries have guarantees on returns built into their 2nd pillar systems. In systems with a
limited number of funds, e.g.,  as in the Chilean case, funds may be induced to construct
portfolios that resemble each other. This might even be the aim of the system's designers.
With the goal of having a large choice of funds - with various profiles - as in the Swedish
system, it makes no sense to have a guarantee on returns. Instead, given the Swedish model,
people who wish to follow "the"  index should be advised to choose an index fund, or a mix of
appropriate index funds.
In fact, if an index-related guarantee is the goal, it would be cheapest to create a small number
of index funds (with competition for administration) covering appropriate domestic and foreign
equity and bond markets. This arrangement holds down administrative costs, but it leaves only
limited room for individual choice of risk and returns. In addition, in the Swedish context it
was thought to be inappropriate, for the reasons discussed above, to create a few large "semi-
public" funds.
Timing of the conversion of the capital account into an annuity
It is important for the individual to be given the choice of when to convert his/her capital account
into an annuity, after a given minimum age. In the Swedish context, the 2nd pillar benefit is only
one of a potentially large portfolio of "retirement assets" on which the retiree can dra,r  including
his/her PAYG retirement benefit. Since financial markets are volatile. individuals should not be
forced to convert their investment portfolios into an annuity at a time when doing so may be
35disadvantageous for them. Part of the information provided to individuals must include general
advice on moving individual funds from more to less risky funds as they approach the annuity
phase.
Benefits
A benefit can be claimed at any time from the age of 61, and it can be claimed together with
or separately from the NDC benefit. The individual can choose:
*  a single life annuity,
*  a joint  life annuity,
*  a single life annuity with a survivor benefit, or
*  a survivor benefit.
Annuities are based on the unisex life expectancy of persons in the age cohort from  the year
the annuity is claimed. The life annuity can be a fixed-rate or variable-rate annuity.  A fixed-
rate annuity will be modeled after a mutual insurance product, taking into account a rate of
return on the insurance fund. The annuity should cover inflation plus a real return of at least
1.5 percent,  but perhaps more, depending on the composition of the insurance fund portfolio.
The variable-rate annuity arises if the individual chooses to leave his/her capital in the fund(s)
in which he/she had money during the accumulation period. If this option is chosen, the size of
the annuity will reflect the current value of the fund(s).
Participants can choose to purchase a survivor benefit, instead of or in combination wvith
his/her own lifetime annuity. The survivor benefit will be calculated on a customary actuarial
basis. A survivor benefit can also be purchased during the individual's  active period in the
labor force. Individuals participating in this separate scheme will bear the cost of this
insurance.
It will be possible to claim a partial annuity in proportions  that follow the legal design of the
NDC system, which allows for 25, 50. 75 or 100 per cent of a full benefit. It is possible to
discontinue an annuity and then to reclaim a recalculated benefit later.  It is also possible to
combine work and a benefit and continue to contribute to this system, thereby enhancing
pension capital.
Taxation
Benefits, but not fund capital, will be taxed in the Swedish system,  thus providing equal
treatment of all components of the mandatory social security system. If in addition,  as in the
new Swedish system, there is no separate deduction for pensioners,  the package for the elderly
worker will provide the same tax status for both benefits and income.
Note  that it is questioniable  whether  the 2d pillar manidatorv  schenme  should  ofter ad  voluntary  benetit ot this type as the risk tor adverse
selectioni  is considerahle.
362  How the Swedish  2nd Pillar Model Operates
The Premium  Pension  Authority
The model which Sweden  has chosen separates  the capital accumulation  phase from the
annuity phase institutionally.  Sweden  has set up a separate  authority, the Premium  Pension
Authority (PPA), to act as the clearing  house during the investment  phase for individual
transactions vis a vis funds and to be the sole provider of annuities  during the insurance  phase.
This section of the paper is devoted  to explaining  what this authority  does and how it is
integrated  into the rest of the social insurance  system.
The PPA was established  in July, 1998. Its first major task was to design its business. The
most urgent technical  development  problem was to construct the IT-program for trading fund
shares and keeping individual  accounts  on a daily basis. In addition, staff at the PPA, at a call
center and in the local offices  of the social insurance  administration  had to be trained, and in
general all of the procedures  of a new  business had to be set up. Money has been allocated
each year to the 2nd pillar system  beginning  in 1995. This money  has accumulated  in an
"interim fund" (see below).  From September  2000, contributions  from 1995-1998  will be
transferred into funds  chosen for the first time by individuals.
The principal responsibilities  of the PPA are the following:
•  enter into contracts  with funds applying  to participate  in the system,
*  execute aggregate  purchases  vis a vis the participating  funds,
*  collect and make available  information  on fund share values on a daily basis,
*  keep the individual  accounts  for the system, and
*  provide the insurance  products  specified  by law.
In principle, there will be no limit to the number of funds in which an individual  may have
shares at any given time. Neither is there a limit on the number of transactions  which an
individual  may make. In the initial years the costs of all fund changes will be shared among  all
participants. The logic behind  this is that it may be difficult for some to make what they
themselves  consider to be satisfactory  choices in the beginning. Presently, only about half the
Swedish  population  has money  of their own in funds, so for many people making this type of
investment  choice will be a very new experience.  In time, however, an individual  fee might be
charged for persons who make  more than some "normal" number of transactions  per year.
The PPA will use the facilities  and services of:
*  the National  Tax Authority  to collect  contributions;
*  the National  Debt Office to invest funds during the interim  between collection of
contributions  and the establishment  of individual  rights (following  tax assessment);
*  the National  Social Insurance  Board to report new contributions  (including  those deriving
from child credits. etc.) produce  and distribute annual account  statements  to individuals
37and, in general, to co-ordinate all information to individuals with regard to the public
pension system;
*  the local social insurance offices for most face-to-face client services.
The NSIB and PPA have set up call centers with a joint switchboard so that clients can be
channeled to the appropriate service.  Information and services for the entire pension system
will be available on the internet as well as through  local offices.
The Financial Supervisory Agency licenses and supervises market funds operating in Sweden
in the course of its normal business. It will also oversee the business of the Premiunm  Pension
Authority. The NSIB has the legal responsibility  to supervise the business of the PPA.
The figure on the following page provides a schematic overview of how the system :.s  set up.
Conditions  for participatingfunds
All funds licensed to operate as investment funds in Sweden can participate in this system,
including companies owned by foreign interests.  Furthermore,  companies licensed within the
European Union and supervised in their own countries can operate within this system.
In addition to being appropriately licensed, companies seeking to participate will have to
*  register and conclude an agreement with the Public Pension Authority,
*  on request provide information to individual shareholders (general  information about the
fund and its periodic reports,  to an individual having the right to subscribe),
*  agree not to charge withdrawal fees, and
*  provide a detailed report of administration  costs charged.
A publicfundfor  "non-choosers"
Since the 2nd pillar is mandatory,  the question arises as to how to treat persons who co not
wish to make an explicit fund choice.  For this group a separate fund will be established. This
fund will hold a mixed portfolio of bonds and domestic and foreign equities. Portfolio
management policy will be decided by the Board of Directors of the fund, with only general
restrictions on maximum portfolio shares for the various components.
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Independent
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Office  *  Calculates  individual earnings - State Treasury - Interim Fund
yearly basis
t  Transfers money to Interim Fund  . Interim investment - average 18 months
\  Transfers information  to NSIB  *  When individual rights are established:
1___ __-_  . - Money  is registered  in individual  accounts
. Investment capital is moved into
* individual funds
Clients
Employers  and self-employed  __The Tax Authority  collects contributions  and establishes earnings
Swedish employers make preliminary tax and contribution payments on a monthly basis,
but report information on individual earnings to the tax authority on an annual basis. This
means that individual earnings and contributions are also established legally on an annual
basis,  and then only after individuals and employers have filed their income tax returns for
the past year and after these have been reconciled with each other. One of the complicating
factors is that individuals can have earnings from self-employment or a combination of self-
employment and employment with one or more employers. Another complicating factor is
the ceiling on earnings that give pension rights in the public system. Calculation of the
exact amount of the contribution requires information from all sources.
After income tax returns have been processed and information from different sources has
been checked for consistency, information on earnings and contributions is transmitted to
the accounting system at the NSIB. This occurs near the end of the year following the year
for which earnings have been reported.
The National Debt Office holds the interim fund
It will take almost two years from the first accounting day of a new vear until current
increments to personal accounts will be established, and money will need to be held and
invested somewhere for an average of about 18 months. For this purpose,  an interim fund
has been established at the National Debt Office (i.e.,  the Swedish treasury).  The rate of
return will be close to that offered on government financial debt.
The National  Social Insurance  Board establishes and records contributions  and sends out
statements
On the basis of the information on earnings and contributions provided by the National Tax
Authority, and information on other sources providing pension rights (child-care, military
service and education rights and rights for compensated days of sickness, unemployment
and disability) individual total contributions are determined and recorded by the NSIB. This
computation is then entered into the accounting system for the clearing house at the PPA.
Information about individual account values is transferred to the NSIB accounts at the end
of the year.
The NSIB prepares and sends out year-end statements with information about the
individual's  current status in both the NDC and funded components of the public system.
Statements are to be sent out in February/March  each year. At this point, all individuals
will be provided with a formal opportunity to confirm or change their fund choices. They
will express their choices on a form to be sent to the Premium Pension Authority. In this
way there will be at least one transaction per year for all participants.
The NSIB is responsible for producing statistics on the entire system and monitorinog  its
performance.
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Clients can also visit and get information from the local offices of the Social Insurance
Administration. The back office at the local offices will be connected with experts at the
PPA to deal with some of the more technical questions that might arise. These meetings,
which are expected to be relatively infrequent, will usually involve inquiries about the
participant's  overall status - i.e.,  including the NDC. The call center may be used more
frequently. It is designed to deal with all aspects of the entire pension system, including
both front- and back-office services. In addition, clients can obtain both general and
individual information through the internet. There is an internet program designed to
enable individuals to feed in data on their own historical and projected earnings careers. to
specify other assumptions, including fund performance, and thereby to create their own
pension projection for chosen retirement profiles.
Administrative costs for  asset management
In the first year of operation, year 2000, over 500 funds registered to manage assets. The
PPM is a single client, with at most one transaction per day vis a  vis any specific fund
manager - and normally the transaction amount will be very small relative to the amount of
total assets managed on the PPM's  behalf. On the other hand,  a large amount of money
will be transferred  on an annual basis, in conjunction with the transfer of new contributions
covering a whole year.
The fund manager's  cost of administrating PPM assets should be very low under these
circumstances. For this reason, the PPM uses a fee schedule designed to keep asset
management costs low for the participants. To participate in the system fund managers
must agree to a fee schedule. Managers are allowed to charge what they normally charge in
the way of administration fees, but have to return a certain amount to the PPM if their
administration fees exceed a specified amount. This "rebate"  is calculated according to the
formula in the box.
Calculation  of the Administrative  Cost Reduction,
for Funds  with Fixed Administrative  Charges
reduction =[NC  - (Free + (1  - R)(NC - Free))] (Asset  in  PPM  system)
NC  - Fund manager's  normal fee charge
Free  - Flat rebate for an asset interval (see Table)
R  - Incremental rebate for an asset interval (see Table)
Note that  this computation  is made on a daily basis.
The following table illustrates how the rebate system will work in practice. Funds
managing PPM assets of 7 billion SEK or more (800 million USD at an exchange rate of
418.75 SEK/USD) are freed from a rebate if they charge 0.12 percent or less. At the other
extreme a small fund can charge, after paying the rebate, just over  1.2 percent.
Fund Manager
Normal  Rebate  payable
administrative  Flat rebate rate,  to PPM, % of  Administrative  cost
cost, % of fund's  % of fund's  PPM  Incremental  fund's  PPM  after rebate, % of
PPM assets  assets  rebatefactor  assets  fund's  PPM assets
1. Managers  holding less than 70 million SEK in PPM  Funds
1.5  0.4  0.25  0.275  1.225
1.0  0.4  0.25  0.15  0.85
0.5  0.4  0.25  0.025  0.475
0.12  0.4  0.25  0  0.12
2.  Managers  holding 70 to 300 million SEK in PPM  Funds
1.5  0.35  0.65  0.7475  0.7525
1.0  0.35  0.65  0.4225  0.5775
0.5  0.35  0.65  0.0975  0.4025
0.12  0.35  0.65  0  0,12
3.  Managers  holding 300  million to 500  million SEK in PPM  Funds
1.5  0.3  0.85  1.02  0.48
1.0  0.3  0.85  0.595  0.405
0.5  0.3  0.85  0.17  0.33
0.12  0.3  0.85  0  0.12
4.  Managers  holding 500  million to 3000  million SEK in PPM  Funds
1.5  0.25  0.95  1.1875  0.3125
1.0  0.25  0.95  0.7125  0.2875
0.5  0.25  0.95  0.2375  0.2625
0.12  0.25  0.95  0  0.12
5.  Managers  holding 3000  to 7000  million SEK in PPM Funds
1.5  0.15  0.95  1.2825  0.2175
1.0  0.15  0.95  0.8075  0.1925
0.5  0.15  0.95  0.3325  0.1675
0.12  0.15  0.95  0  0.12
6.  Managers  holding more than 7000  million SEK in PPM  Funds
1.5  0.12  0.96  1.3248  0.1752
1.0  0.12  0.96  0.8448  0.1552
0.5  0.12  0.96  0.3648  0.1352
0.12  0.12  0.96  0  0.12
42Appendix 1.  The NDC Annuity and Indexation
Denote the age and gender-dependent one-year death risk in the population by q, and
define the survival (rate) probability as h =  1 - q. This is the probability that a person of a
given age will survive in period t.
From the survival probabilities a function
(1)  lx (age i) =  lx(age i-1) h(age i)
can be constructed for each gender. The value for the lowest age in the calculations is set
at unity.
An annuity  without a rate of return
Life expectancy for a person of age i at some given time is obtained by summing over the
Ix-values to the last year for which people presently living are alive,  N, and divide by the
Ix-value for the age we are considering:
I  Ix,
(2)  G,  IXj lxi
The result is called the G-value.
The annuity is calculated by dividing notional capital accredited at the time of retirement,
C, with life expectancy from the time of retirement:
(3)  Annuity  C/G
This annuity can be price-indexed,  indexed to the contribution-wage sum or to the per-
capita wage sum, or indexed with some combination of wages and prices. It should be kept
in mind, however, that the system is financially stable in the insurance sense - i.e.,
contributions are always what are needed to pay for benefits in the long-run, only with
contribution-wage-sum indexation. For example, as long as the wage sum grows,  a
perpetual surplus will arise with price indexation of benefits. If per-capita wage indexation
is chosen, the system will encounter growing financial deficits with a persistently
decreasing labor force and surpluses with a persistently increasing labor force.
43An NDC annuity with an imputed rate of  "economic" return
The G-value with a real rate of return,  r, is expressed  as
r(1  +  r)(,i)IX
G  ,  =, (4)  G.  =  ixi
and the corresponding annuity is
(5)  Annuitywi,h =  C/Gj,
In the NDC PAYG system, the rate of return is an assumed - i.e.,  "norm"  - real rate of
growth in earnings based on the contribution base.
The difference between expression (5) and that underlying an annuity in the 2nd pil,ar
system is simply the rate of return. In the funded system the rate of return is the market
yield on funded capital. With a system of individual accounts invested in private  funds or
competing insurance companies, this rate will vary among individuals. In the NDC PAYG
framework, everyone receives the same rate of return.
In order to maintain financial stability in the annuity version of the model, benefit
adjustments must be made when real economic growth deviates from the norm rate of
return. The "real-growth adjustment factor" works as follows:
7)  Benefit,+ 1 =  Benefit, (1 +  7t)  [ 1  +  (actual growth rate percent  - norm)]
The benefit is price indexed (7A)  and then adjusted for the deviation of actual real growth
from the norm. If the norm were 2 percent,  i.e.,  representing an assumed 2 percent annual
"return",  then real growth of 2.5 percent would lead to an "economic"  supplement to price
indexation, and real growth of 1.5 percent would lead to an adjustment downward.
Why not discretionary benefit adjustments?
There is one final option for indexing benefits that deserves mention. Instead of employing
some form of automatic real indexation of benefits,  indexation could be combined with
discretionary "bonuses". This means that an actuarial calculation would be made
periodically, and when it is evident that real growth has created "excess" funds, a bonus
would be provided. In other words,  the bonus would be based on actuarial long-term
prognoses of the system's solvency.
What can be said in favor of this alternative is that the size of the annual "bonus" can be
determined in terms of successive calculations of long-term affordability.  The method is
essentially that used by mutual insurance societies.
44There is an important  difference  between  the government  and an insurance  society,
however, that detracts  from the appeal  of letting the social insurance  administration
propose discretionary  changes  in benefits  based on long-term  financial  evaluations,  unless
this decision is completely  autonomous  from the government.  As opposed to an insurance
society, the pension  system  is but one of many government  commitments  (such as national
defense, roads, policies  tailored for special interest groups, etc.). The politicians  will thus
have trouble keeping their hands off the pension system's money. A method of indexation
based on fund calculations  would  also have to be clearly specified  to avoid political
manipulation  and the risk of public mistrust. Note that, if there is no fund at the starting
date for the system,5 in practice, such a mechanism  would  end up doing exactly  what
wage-sum  indexation  will do.
"For  example.  Sweden has a large initial fund which could be distributed in the future according to some rule encompassing both past
and new system commitments.
45Appendix  2. Models of Transforming  Disability  Benefits  into Old-Age
Benefits
An important question regarding disability is when and how this benefit should be
transformed into an old-age benefit. There are several options. Among these are the
following:
Model 1. No transfer of contributions based on imputed earnings during time with
disability benefits. Instead, when the disability recipient reaches the minimum age for
retirement with an old-age benefit, the old-age pension from notional capital in the NDC
and financial capital in the 2nd  tier are computed. The pensioner has the option of taking the
higher of two alternatives,  the old-age benefit or his/her current disability benefit. If the
disability benefit is higher,  the old-age system can be paid the excess amount to supplement
the financing of the old-age benefit."6
Model 2. Transfer contributions for imputed income for persons on disability into the NDC
and 2nd pillar accounts up until the established age for conversion of the disability pension
to an old-age benefit. There are different approaches to conversion. Examples are:
•  Convert the disability benefit to an old-age pension at the minimum retirement age for
the old-age benefit. In Sweden this would be at the age of 61. This means that t1he
individual earns no extra capital after age 60 and receives the same actuarially reduced
benefit that any (non-disability) person choosing to retire at the age of 61 would have
received.
*  Convert the disability benefit to an old-age benefit at some other age above the
minimum retirement  age, e.g.  the age of 65, with continuation of transfers into the
NDC and 2nd pillar accounts until the conversion age.
*  Convert the disability benefit to an old-age benefit at some other age above the
minimum retirement age, e.g.  the age of 65, with continuation of transfers into the
ADC and 2nd  pillar accounts until the conversion age but using a less generous formula
for  computing rights, from  some specific age. In the Swedish reform, the current
proposal  is to give reduced rights to persons aged 60-64 and convert to an old-age
benefit at the age of 65.
*  Convert the disability benefit to an old-age benefit at some other age above the
minimum retirement age, e.g.  the age of 65, but from a specified age, e.g.,  60,
discontinue transfers into the NDC and 2nd pillar accounts.
1 Note that this is the model proposed  in the Polish reform.
46In the latter three alternatives, it would be possible also to: a) discontinue indexation of
NDC notional capital after the minimum age for an old-age benefit, or b) use a less
advantageous indexation formula.
Model 3.For Model 2 it would also be possible to guarantee, as in Model 1, that the
benefit a former disability recipient receives in old age will not fall below the amount of
the disability benefit previously. If the difference is positive, this sort of guarantee would
constitute an extra cost to be borne by the state budget or disability insurance system.
Perhaps a word of caution is appropriate here. As is well known, the opportunity cost for
older workers of remaining in the labor force instead of "taking" a disability benefit can be
high. Generally,  the goal of designing policy in this respect is to provide adequate and fair
income replacement for individuals who have no reasonable alternative to taking a
disability benefit.
There are two conditions for successfully achieving this goal. First,  disability criteria must
be applied stringently, and, second there should exist good occupational schemes to help
older workers who are not disabled but nevertheless for various reasons (usually a
combination of age and work requirements) need to withdraw from the labor force earlier.
If these conditions are not fulfilled, experience tells us that employers - often with the
strong support of labor representatives - will make use of liberal disability rules to lay off
workers whose performance capacity is not 100 percent, but who could still work, albeit
perhaps with a lower wage.
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This  paper  describes  the  recent  Swedish  reform  and  available  options  on major  issues
within  this  reform  framework.  In  June  1994,  Sweden's  Parliament  passed  legislation
replacing  the  old  defined  benefit  system  with a  combination  of  a pay-as-you-go  notional
defined  contribution  (NDC)  and  a DC  privately  managed  financial  account  scheme,  based
on a  total  contribution  rate  of 18.5  percent  on  earnings.  The  financial  account  scheme  is
run  using  a  state-clearing  house  as  a  broker,  and  will have  a  state  monopoly  supplier  of
annuities.  During  the  accumulation  period,  participants  can  choose  among  all registered
funds,  about  500  when  they  make  their  first  choice  in  the  autumn  of  2000.  Accounts  were
created  in 1999,  and  two  annual  statements  have  been  sent  out  since  then.
If the  NDC  and  financial  account  schemes  together  do not reach  a minimum  level  by
age  65, and  the  individual  chooses  to retire  at  this  age,  benefits  from  these  systems  will
be supplemented  up  to  the  guarantee  level,  determined  by  Parliament  and  financed  with
a state  budget  transfer.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  the PAYG  NDC  and  financial  account
schemes  are  designed  to function  autonomously  from  social  policy.  Life  expectancy  is
factored  into  the NDC  annuity,  and  together  with  the  financial  account  system,  this
innovation  helps  to shift  the  risk  of  an aging  society  onto  workers  while  they  are  still
active.  There  is  no maximum  retirement  age,  and  the  system  offers  a  broad  range  of
options  for labor-force  exit  for  older  workers.  Full,  partial  or no earnings  from  work  can
be  combined  freely  with  full or partial  annuities  from  one  or  both  of  the  public  schemes
from  the  minimum  pension  age  of 61.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  NETWORK
Abou  thi sees